A synthesis of how innovation may be interpreted in the language of social action is suggested, which builds on the dialectics between action as mental activity and physical work.
processual steps towards a goal, e.g. utilization or commercialization and revenue. In trying to define innovation, one has to take account of semantic components that do not seem to have prima facie coherence at the level of semantics alone. That is why innovation still manages to create conceptual fluster in the community of scholars who utilize the term: it may be taken to refer to a new product or process, or to a creative leap of mind, an innovation in the sense of 'to innovate'; the adverb of being 'innovative' has similarly been taken to mean being creative and original, or simply having a large number of products.
My suggestion is that what is missing from the concept of innovation should not be sought on the level of semantics at all. That which unifies the usage of the term must instead be located in the understanding that innovation is always related to social action in one form or the other. Thus the grist between the semantic stones of different concepts of innovation should be sought in a clearer understanding of what type of social action is implied in innovation. Such an understanding could help to resolve some of the conceptual impasses that have bogged down innovation on a conceptual plane, by pulling the discourse up to the level of priesis: a language of action. This would possibly lead the way to an innovation concept more likely to contribute common explanatory understanding to some of the phenomena that we call 'innovative' as well as to the process of 'innovation'. This paper is thus an attempt to develop an understanding of innovation by utilizing a number of social theoretical conceptions of action. The aim of such an analysis is first to contribute to the theoretical understanding of innovation as a basic social/cognitive activity, and thereby try to remedy some of the shortcomings of naively functionalist process frameworks, which, in effect, beg the question of the institutional context of innovation. Rather than looking to 'shallow' and temporary corporate structures for explanations, the ambition here is rather to bring some of the insights of social theory together into what could ambitiously be called a sociological skeleton-key to innovative action.
I believe that at the heart of innovation lies a social act, i.e. ideating a concept or a mental object, a desired goal, and then physically acting to create and disseminate a product of some kind into a unit of adoption. The concepts of social action and behaviour are sometimes used interchangeably in the literature. In social theory it is more common to refer to human acts as being constituted by an intentional, goal-directed and reflected relation to the world. Behaviour on the other hand is automatic, unintentional and unreflected (e.g. Giddens, 1979) . The theoretical underpinnings of innovation theory are often found in a behaviourbiased, if not behaviourist, conception. Consider, for instance, the following quote:
In a process as uncertain and complex as innovation, luck plays a part. There are cases where success comes by accident . . . [R]eal success lies in being able to repeat the trick. . . . [T] hat success is based on the ability to Organization 11(5) Articles learn and repeat these behaviours; it is similar to the golfer Gary Player's comment that 'the more I practice the luckier I get'. (Tidd et al., 2001: 18-19) The point is not that the authors are wrong in what they are proposing, but rather that this framing begs a particular model of (wo)man, as s/he engages in the project of innovation. In contradistinction to this model, innovation should be taken to necessarily imply the purposeful projection of a vision and the act involved in fulfilling it. In this respect, the act of innovating replicates the basic social and cognitive predicaments of anyone acting, but with a couple of peculiar additions.
For one, the concept of innovation is usually taken to mean 'something new'. This basic notion may be said to pertain to the newness of things created, e.g. products and other outcomes (Kimberly and Evanisko, 1981) , and to the newness of the process of introducing or adopting these new things into some social context (Rogers, 1983) . Innovation thence denotes the process of conceptual creation, production and (possibly) new means of dissemination, of something substantial and new, and it denotes this something as an object or objectified form. In this paper I am interested in understanding innovation qua social action. I am therefore concerned with what social theory can tell us about the social theoretical conditions for newness as it pertains to action. In order to lay the foundations for such a conception I will first outline a view of innovation that relates it to the concept of newness and to action. I will then revisit some theories of social action in the light of this understanding of innovation. After elaborating on a number of functionalist and conflict theoretical approaches to the innovation concept, this discussion will be condensed into a new social theoretical model of innovation as social action.
Innovation and the New
When the concept of innovation is explicated in the technology management and economics literature it is common to perform some reductive operationalization along the lines of emphasizing innovation speed-i.e. the pace at which or quickness with which a firm develops or makes use of a technology relative to other firms or industries (Kessler and Chakrabarti, 1996; Dosi, 1988 )-or innovation magnitude-i.e. the number of processes or products developed or adopted (Gopalakrishnan, 2000) . In addition, an innovation (process or product) is almost always understood to have to be new in some way. However, these definitions, taken as they stand, have led to some peculiarities.
For instance, with respect to speed it has been shown that, if a firm adopted an innovation earlier than another in one instance, it does not follow that it will continue to exhibit that behaviour. So in what respect is the firm 'innovative' by dint of its history (Downs and Mohr, 1976) ? Also, studies that utilize the magnitude qualifier tend to have great difficulty in differentiating conceptually between early and late adopters Innovation as Social Action Tomas Hellström of an innovation (Subramanian and Nilakanta, 1996) . Can a firm qualify as innovative by performing an act of automatic or blind adoption? What is missing from these operationalizations seems to be a conception of innovation as a certain kind of action, namely one that involves the conception of something new or an action towards the new. When defining innovation, economists and organizational researchers alike tend to view the concept as broadly referring to a product, process or practice that is new to the industry (e.g. Acs and Audretsch, 1990) . A more encompassing object-, process-and action-oriented definition of innovation is that it is:
. . . a complex activity which proceeds from the conceptualisation of a new idea to a solution of the problem and then to the utilisation of economic or social value. Alternatively innovation is not just the conception of a new idea, nor the invention of a new device, nor the development of a new market. The process is all of those things acting together in an integrated fashion. (Myers and Marquis, 1969: 1) As an addendum to this definition some researchers have argued that it is the perception of newness that is distinguishing, not whether or not that something is new 'everywhere'. Accordingly, Zaltman et al. (1973) have designated innovation to be the artefact or process that is new to its unit of adoption. Bringing the concept back to the innovating subject, this view would be taken to imply innovation as an activity that is conceptual as well as physical; it concerns a problem and its solution; it involves something that is new, and it is therefore on the whole future oriented. It is the qualifier of goal-directed originality and newness that serves to differentiate innovation from mere change (Slappendel, 1996) .
The key to the concept seems to be through ascertaining the dialectical relationship involved in acting to resolve a problem of some kind, i.e. finding the interface between the abstract (what a problem is, what one wants to do, what a need is) and the concrete (how to make thing happen, how to mould the environment, physical acts). Lowe (1995) has suggested that the process of innovation, on the personal and organizational level, involves the components of ambiguity, or the deliberate seeking of areas of uncertainty and then exploiting them; transformation, where obstacles to the business are transformed into strategic advantage to support the solution; and finally reflexivity, where the 'inner dream' or creative drive of the innovating actors is continuously traded against the concrete goals of the innovative process (e.g. a new product). Nightingale (1998) has attempted to theoretically ground a similar model, suggesting that the distinguishing feature of innovation lies in its direction towards a desired end result, and that the process of innovation is the goal-directed search for the yet unknown conditions that will achieve this result. Science on the other hand, Nightingale argues, moves in the opposite direction, from known starting conditions towards unknown end results. In moving towards 'the known' future, the innovator relies on tacit technological trajectories and traditional knowledge, Organization 11(5) Articles which themselves reside outside the realm of science proper. This idea owes much to what Layton (1974: 39) held to be the grist of technological knowledge, namely the 'active and purposive adaptation of means to some human end'.
It seems that projecting and affecting are integral parts of an innovation/action nexus, where both concepts say something about innovation and 'the new', in the sense that what is innovative in innovation is the effectuation or enactment of the particular something that is, or once was, not already achieved but that for some reason needs to be. With this understanding of innovation we are moving closer to what I believe to be the core of the concept, namely action or, as this article will come to develop it, social action. I will now look more closely at a couple of received notions of social action, and then contrast special instances of these to the idea of innovation outlined above.
Notions of Social Action
It has been said about action that its division into types is always contingent, not on the actual end result, effects or whatever of that act, but on what the actor intended with the act (e.g. Weber, 1978; Barnes, 1995) . That way, action becomes a composite concept that depends for its classification on ideal-type mental states rather than reconstructed outcomes or observed structural dispositions that the actor may be implicated in at the time of acting. It also hints at the composite nature of the mental disposition as such. An act is not likely to be constituted by one type of mental state alone; all types figure, albeit one may dominate in the specific situation. Our treatment should therefore be taken as idealtypical, in the sense that neither theory nor reality is truly satisfied by it. Rather it has to be intuitively understood as connected to some meaningful activity; this is the same as with the concept of innovation.
The best-known typology of action is the one proposed by Max Weber (1947) , which identifies instrumental action, or action intentionally directed towards the fulfilment of a goal, as a distinct trait of our times. The means-ends rationality of this type of action may help to elucidate significant aspects of the concept of innovation (more about this below). However, Weber's treatment contrasts this type of action to a number of others, which, in the sense of the argument so far, should be seen as analytically distinct yet to a degree present in every action. Thus Weber mentions value-rational action, i.e. the kind of action that aims at fulfilling a set of norms or values regardless of the substantive outcomes of that action. He also identifies traditional action, which is taken to be directed at perpetuating the received ways of doing things, and affectual action, which is conceived to be the concrete expression of a feeling, emotion, etc.
Again we see here the connection of the act to a state of mind or at best a subjective intention, rather than to the substantial outcomes. For
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instance, the development of a new process technology for the pulp and paper industry is on the face of it instrumental, in the sense that production volume needs to increase in order for the firm to respond to demand. However, this type of act of innovation may, on closer examination, reveal the presence of a value-rationality in the firm with respect to the act of investing in new processes being positive in and of itself. Moreover, the specific process technology may be chosen on the basis of tradition, i.e. an act of traditional action, which may be contrasted to any means-ends rationality. Finally, driving the decision to invest through, and eventually convincing workers to adopt the technology, is likely to carry strong components of affectual action; that is, it will be founded on emotional drivers. One may even hypothesize that no innovation is possible on the basis of instrumental action alone.
Working from Weber's original typology, Habermas (1984) developed a classification that would be slightly more familiar to an organization scholar, in that it better captures some of the phenomena present in organizational society, as it eventually developed (Etzioni, 1970) . Habermas introduces the term purposive-rational to qualify actions oriented towards success of some kind-whether it be success in acting upon the physical world (instrumental action) or success in contexts where the acts of other people have to be taken into account as well as the physical world (strategic action). Strategic action is probably most applicable to the entrepreneur, who has to activate social networks and physical resources in order to carry out a venture (Dubini and Aldrich, 1991) . This entrepreneur would also have to enact Habermas's concept of dramaturgical action, which is essentially about conveying a particular image of oneself to others.
To stay with the entrepreneur for a moment, s/he would eventually enact a number of norms embedded in the project of being an entrepreneur, whether as a response to societal norms that entrepreneurship is good, or as the result of a mindset necessary to survive the expectations of 'external' stakeholders such as venture capitalists. As a final leg of his typology, Habermas develops the concept of communicative action, which is essentially about action directed towards achieving mutual understanding. From one perspective this may seem the least notable form of action in entrepreneurial capitalist societies. However, as I will argue below, most action must cluster around the will for mutual understanding if anything is going to happen at all. That being said, mutual understanding between two actors does not always imply that their interests will converge.
These types represent an array of attempts from within social theory to capture essential aspects of action. I have chosen to focus on a few of these: on the normative dimension of innovation and action, on the concept of innovation as dialectical action and work, and on the reification that some forms of instrumentalism bring about. Finally, the treatOrganization 11(5) Articles ment will touch on the fruitful and necessary tension between purposive and communicative action in the innovation process.
Innovation as Normative Action
The notion of normative action goes to the centre of how we come to understand the phenomenon of innovation as being a socially and analytically distinct event. An example of this social distinctiveness may be found in the Schumpeterian vision of how the innovating entrepreneur creates a disequilibrium in the social fabric and thereby produces something qualitatively different from that which was present in the social system in the first place (Schumpeter, 1934) . It should be noted here that, although the Schumpeterian entrepreneur innovates through combining existing resources, s/he is always involved in doing something essentially new (Swedberg, 2000) . The main question for this section is: what are the normative forces affecting a social system's ability to transcend, renew or destroy itself (see Schumpeter's concept of innovation as a form of creative destruction)? And, following from this: how does innovation in this sense become a desirable focus for action in the first place? In addressing this question, I elaborate on Talcott Parsons' theory of norms. I want to emphasize here that my interest is in the implications of Parsons' functionalism for how the individual acts vis-avis the social fabric, and I will therefore refrain from touching upon his ideas concerning the relation of institutions or the evolution (sic) of society.
In the sense of being purposeful and norm driven, it is possible to discern already in Hegel (e.g. [1830] 1993) at least two prima facie types of action relevant for understanding the process of innovation: action as the realization of purpose or intention; and action as a means to achieve a preconceived goal. In the former case, the content of the purpose and direction of action, i.e. the goal in Nightingale's (1998) sense, may be less clearly conceived of at the outset, but it gradually becomes clearer as the individual acts and comes closer to having realized something. In hindsight it may look as if there was an obvious purpose to the innovation process all along. This is typical of artistic creation, where objects are left in the tracks of continuous creation (Koestler, 1964) . The self is here objectified by acting. Hegel suggests that such objectification must be counterbalanced with reflection. In the second instance, there is action as a means to achieve a certain end. Here action is merely a 'physical repetition' of the original intention, and this intention does not change in the course of continuous action towards the goal. Objectifications of such acts are merely additional means to reach the original goal. It is likely that a theory of innovation set at the level of the individual must be able to account for both of these types of action. They both have normative dimensions-the innovator as simulataneous creative artist and hardnosed implementer of a preconceived vision.
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These two types were analysed by Parsons in his seminal The Structure of Social Action (1937) , in which he put forward the claim that none of these types can account for intentional, directed action, because they bracket the initial drives to act. The basic quandary was one familiar from Schumpeterian economics, but framed slightly differently by Parsons. Where Schumpeter's key drivers for entrepreneurial action had drawn on notions such as 'the dream and the will to found a private kingdom' and 'the will to conquer' (Schumpeter, 1934) , and where Schumpeter favoured an individualistic innovator and hence an individually founded rationale for action, Parsons aimed at a more socialized framework. He criticized the utilitarian theory of action on which liberal market economics of the time was built, and in which actions are constituted by (1) an acting person, (2) the conditions for action, (3) a goal and (4) technically reasonable means to achieve this goal. The heart of the problem was that these conditions, if met, clearly make action possible, but there is nothing in the theory to tell us why actions would be carried out in a particular way, or why anybody should act or set goals in the first place. The conditions say something about means and ends, but give us no grounds for interrogating the relation between the two types of purposive action depicted above: are goals always incremental and temporary, or are they governed by a directed stable social intention? The question that is presented to us in the context of Parsons' critique is thus: are these four conditions enough to bring about innovation qua goal-oriented action proper or, in the context of our problem, will the conditions bring about an intentional, innovative break with certain established forms of social life? We have actor, goal and means, yes, but what is lacking in this conceptual skeleton is a notion of why it would be rational to pursue a specific innovative, pattern-breaking end in the first place. Parsons' answer was that what is needed is an explanatory recourse to values or norms that may direct or initiate action, norms being the fifth component of the desiderata listed above. But can norms really account for actions such as those involved in Schumpeterian radical innovations?
We may pursue this dilemma by revisiting what Lockwood (1964) referred to as Parsons' normative functionalism, or the idea that social integration is achieved through a shared set of norms and values. Parsons' social system is constituted by a number of roles and statuses. Associated with every status is a corresponding set of expectations of other statuses in that social system. When the actor acts according to expectations, the role is fulfilled and the status retained. Expectations about a role will typically depend on its expected and conditioned relation to other roles and statuses, and the actions of a role resonate with the expectations of the other roles. When one acts in accordance with the norms, one contributes to system maintenance and stability. Internal regulatives act against the occasional urges of self-interest, but only insofar as the social system of related roles dictates this. This system, which we can assume may be constructed in a variety of ways, thus Organization 11(5) Articles leaves a certain amount of normative, regulated 'action' open to the individual, although it is not likely that the larger social system would itself sustain norms that might challenge its own roles and statuses. In other words, if norms are the missing term in a purpose-driven theory of action, such as the concept of innovation would demand, then clearly these norms could not emanate from the larger social system that is targeted for innovation, and innovative action could not be normatively sustained from within that larger social system. On a practical note, the fact of the matter is that the whole concept of creating incubators for innovative activities rests in part on this assumption of innovation as normative action, in the sense that norms and individuals must, so to speak, be incubated at the same time.
The idea is that, in order to be innovative in a larger social system, the innovating group or person has to be 'incubated' in another social system where role expectations, and hence norm-driven actions, would be innovative vis-a-vis the outside social system. The argument is that, owing to its interconnected pattern of role expectations, any social system can reproduce only normative action that sustains its social equilibrium, and hence cannot innovate. Leaving out the incubators, a closer look at the 'un-incubated' innovator would probably reveal a coherent subsystem of 'normalized' innovation, with role and status expectation ties and engrained norm structures between inventors, entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, business angels, etc., as well as strict borders and rules for the transfer of innovations to the larger system. This being said, there is (at least) one question left to answer, one that always dogs functionalist explanation: how does it all start? What makes a person initially act outside the norms of the system, if only so as to enter into an innovating subsystem? In order to resolve this issue one has to have recourse to a conflict theoretical notion of innovation, especially concepts that acknowledge the dimension of innovation as an act in dialectical opposition to a given situation. In order to do this I will explore certain aspects of the writings of Marx and Lukács, which might shed some light on the way innovating action originates in conflict.
Innovation as Dialectical Action and Work
The notion of dialectical action necessarily takes its point of departure from Hegel and his notion of the role of contradiction in history (Hegel, [1830 (Hegel, [ ] 1993 . Innovation from the point of view of Hegel's dialectics implies that progress comes about not in a smooth and orderly manner (not incrementally as is assumed in, for instance, Kaizen and linear stagegate models of innovation), but rather through various competing and disrupted forms where conflict and power struggle play a central role. An idea may develop into what it has the potential to become only by being positioned in opposition to existing notions and orders. In this process, the already existing orders may be destroyed (or radically reinterpreted);
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history evolves by destroying what it was (cf. Hegel's metaphor of the plant consuming the seed from which it stemmed). Hence Hegel holds that history and historical action (and, in our sense of the term, also innovation) proceed through contradiction. Conflict engenders new and better ideas and pushes towards a more comprehensive understanding (Hegel, [1830 (Hegel, [ ] 1993 .
In the context of innovation, it is important to note that it is not just ideas that conflict in Hegel's conception; rather, since every time is dominated by its own typical set of contradictions, notions may also contradict the Zeitgeist in a more fundamental manner (Houlgate, 1991) . Zeitgeist is the social and cultural expression of periods, but may also be concretely manifested in particular peoples and places. The type of generic innovation described by, among others, Freeman (1982) and Perez (1983) , in which a fundamental innovation creates a whole new techno-paradigm, leading to clusters of innovation around a new core process (e.g. electricity or the steam engine), may be the physical expression of an emergent Zeitgeist. On a higher level of sociocultural resolution, a typical but meaningful contradiction of our time is the conception of the innovating entrepreneur as being both a 'sign of the times', or a generalized cultural type, and yet a pure expression of individual intentions, as in the notion of the entrepreneur hero (e.g. Lowe, 2001) .
Marxian theory enables us not only to draw on these Hegelian insights but to locate them more firmly in the context of physical human activity, i.e. in the social action implied in technical change and work. Contrary to popular belief, Marx strongly held that it is human-generated ideas that produce technology, physical structure, etc., not the other way around. Humans are masters of their world and, in this regard, alienation in Marxist theory, or Entfremdegung vis-a-vis the products of production, stems essentially from people's self-denial of their nature as agents. The notion of the 'un-realized innovation capability' of people, firms or regions (Dodgson, 1993) may thus be reconstructed in a Marxian vein, so that people's inability to realize their potential is said to rest on an ideology of conformism and a false understanding of what it means to be human (i.e. to have agency). Marx's voluntarism in this regard suggests that people make themselves through their labour; they can reshape themselves and society and, by extension, this is what makes them capable of eventually innovating for other purposes than those intended by the powers that be. However, the potential for such innovation must exist in the real conditions of life, rather than in the logical potential of ideas (Marx, [1847 (Marx, [ ] 1961 . This is where I turn to the second access point that Marxian theory offers a conception of innovation as action, namely that of work.
Work physically transforms the world around us. Marx puts great emphasis on the constitutive nature of work as compared with mental activity, and here he represents a clear counterpoint to the received dogma of the so-called Knowledge Society, in which thinking allegedly Organization 11(5) Articles transforms the world (see the critique by Fuller, 1998 ). Yet Marx makes the important point that the progress of labour sets us free from the necessity of labour. It is true, and today is received wisdom (e.g. Drucker, 1993) , that this freedom may be used to engage in more intellectual activities, but what about the relation between such mental activities and labour? A hint of such a connection may be found in Marx's concept of 'practical consciousness', i.e. in the particular thinking that is involved when labour is carried out (Marx, [1847 (Marx, [ ] 1961 . This may be the sphere of human action where the ideation that underpins organizational and technical innovation first emerges-in the immediate thinking that is connected with carrying out a work task. The question is: would this reasoning count as 'the mental context of discovery' of an innovation in Marx's sense or as a Marxian theory of innovation writ large?
A lesson first formulated by Marx in connection with this process, which can be related to the notion of innovation's dependence on practical consciousness, is that an entrenched division of labour between thinking and working risks creating a social production of knowledge that grossly misrepresents reality. Such a notion would be of little interest in understanding the dialectical progression of technological change (compare the difference between Marx and Hegel with respect to the importance of the practical and physical). The key notion here, and this is where Marx's divergence from Hegel with respect to the dialectical progression of history becomes important to our argument, is that economic structure in some way is the foundation of society, since it is only after people have taken care of their sustenance that they can innovate and create. Hence, in the big picture of innovation and technological change, 'economics' will always come first, not in a linear manner but as a continuously present basic condition for ideation and innovation. At the same time, the notion of the collective individual who can change economic structure is important in Marx, because this is the only agent of radical change-that is, not the individual but the collective individual (Marx, 1956) . This translates into a collective/individualized notion of innovation and change to which I shall return below.
It has been popularly suggested that the socialist-type revolution predicted by Marx actually did occur in the postwar era, in the opportunistic emergence of a new class structure in which 'brain-workers' and entrepreneurs took charge of the means of production, i.e. their own knowledge and competence (Drucker, 1993; Nordström and Ridderstråle, 1999) . This notion has been criticized for not taking into consideration, among other things, the dependency of so-called knowledge workers on new, more or less socially embedded 'knowledge technologies' that lie beyond their control (Beniger, 1986; Hellström and Raman, 2001; Fuller, 2002) . Furthermore, according to Marx, under any regime of production people either work or own the means of production, and both the people who own and the people who are owned are living unfree deprived lives,
subsumed under a capitalist logic of exploitation. From a critical perspective then, entrepreneurial brain-workers who both own and are owned by themselves have willingly and without conflict entered the iron cage of hegemonic constriction. They are both objects of exploitation and subjects performing the exploitative act, at the same time. In this sense they are maximally restrained rather than free and creative. One way in which such a hegemonic constriction comes about is through what I have earlier referred to as the process of reifying innovation, i.e. placing it outside of the human sphere altogether. In order to elaborate innovation as social action as it pertains to this particular aspect, that is, innovation qua object/thing, it is useful to turn to Lukács.
Innovation as Reification and Dialectical Action
As stated at the beginning of this paper, innovation has been said to denote a thing as well as a process. This duality must be critically assessed with reference to what an innovative thing 'in itself' would look like, particularly given the notion elaborated above that the relation of innovation to the human sphere becomes problematic in the context of hegemonic or, in another more liberal usage, 'over-socialized' understandings of action (see Granovetter, 1985) . The newness attribute of innovation as well as its utility characteristic suggests that innovative artefacts are constituted in the relationship with a user (buyer, receiver, utilizer), one who is new to the concept and who needs it or comes to need it. Although this user constitutes the innovation by wanting or envisioning it, the innovation is itself constitutive of the user's/ innovator's self-what they miss or what they could be. In this sense there is a dialectical relation between the human and the artefactual dimension of the innovation, and innovating becomes a dialectical action encompassing these dimensions.
Often, especially in such concrete contexts as product development and marketing, these constitutive dialectical aspects of innovation are disregarded. In society at large, 'innovative products' may actually find a market whether or not the product is de facto needed; contrary to popular economic belief, market demand is an endogenous factor (Rosenberg, 1994) . This may be formulated more sharply to imply that the question of need is deferred in favour of an opportunistic conception of whether the item is considered innovative 'in itself', i.e. to an innovation fetishism that self-fulfils the prophecy of an exogenous demand being a necessary antecedent to innovation.
Lukács' concept of reification and dialectical action is enlightening in understanding how this phenomenon comes about (Lukács, 1980) . Lukács' concept of a thing, be it an innovation or otherwise, is predominantly material. Objects are subsumed under the laws of gravity, acceleration, force, etc.: they have a given form, stand in a relation to each other and conserve energy. Also, their relation to each other over time Organization 11(5) Articles may be deduced from knowledge of the value of these parameters in the past. Lukács' concept of reification simply implies that the relation between humans appears to be the same as the relation between things. Under certain conditions, humans become visible as things, which they are not.
Humans have the ability to change as a result of their own making, or through 'self-change'. By self-change we mean that they change as a result of their own thinking and work. They self-change constantly and are therefore historical entities who create futures yet are themselves created by the past. Such change cannot be described by reference to covering laws and regularities, because humans, according to Lukács, set themselves apart from such regularities and constraints, both on the mental level through science and philosophy as well as on the physical level through labour and technology. The nature of this transcendence lies in the transgression of the boundary between the surrounding world and themselves, between subject and object, and this transcendence is in essence what I mean by innovation being dialectical action.
The conception of innovation as meaningful or dialectical human action tells us something about what is lost when innovation is regarded as a disembodied thing that is constituted 'outside' of people, i.e. when it is reified. The consequences of understanding innovation as disembodied are easily found in the literature of innovation, as well as in the practice of innovation management. One of the effects of such a view is an increase in the calculative or manipulative treatment of innovations and the social relations in which innovation takes place, with a concomitant emphasis on innovation 'management' rather than interpretation-driven innovation 'dynamics' (see the innovation design school elaborated in e.g. Clark and Staunton, 1994) .
A result of such reification of innovation qua process or product is that actors studying or taking part in the innovation process start to view themselves and others mainly as means towards an end that is itself beyond their control. Innovation scholars thus become the extended arm of innovation management, and product developers and researchers alike become cogs in the machinery of an 'innovation system'. As a result, relations and selves become more thing-like and the social relations of innovation more manipulative.
From Lukács may be read that the calculation and manipulation thus created represent a kind of 'contemplative' mode, in which innovators and entrepreneurs try to place themselves outside the world in a given and unchangeable position. From this position they would then be able to gaze upon the world and try to use it for their own disconnected purposes. From a critical perspective one may reflect that the process of contemplation denies the historical situatedness of humans and impoverishes the dialectical action entailed in innovation. What is problematic is that this has also come to represent the dominant analytical view on innovation, a perspective that in turn leads innovation researchers to
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analytically misunderstand its character, as well as to create a process of managing innovation that systematically tends to fail. The reason for this is that any methodical rules for innovation will, by definition, omit what is significant in such a process, namely the acting subjects' contingent and real-life enactment of their own goals.
In order further to ground this argument in the concept of innovation reification, one may reflect that what Marx referred to as commodity fetishism, in which commodities seem to receive their prices through 'the market' (independently of its producers), resembles distancing similar to that between innovation and its subject. Commodities, like innovations, are then defined in a world of things, in relation to other things, this being a process that supposedly follows laws unknown to humans, but that may 'gradually' become known. The relation between actors and innovations seems forced into being by powers outside human control, in the same way that scientific concepts describing these processes seem outside the sphere of what humans can affect or transcend. In this view, innovation is a commodity, as is the innovator, and the relation between the two, i.e. the process of innovation, is a thing outside of both. If innovation is viewed as a thing and gets its value from some internal quality or through its relation to other things, then its social history of becoming is not about human transcendence, vision or meaningful action. It is easy to reflect then that even a language that perfectly maps the relation between things cannot be used to communicate or affect what makes innovation useful or attractive from an economic perspective. The key lesson from this analysis should be that, whereas in common usage innovation may exist qua artefactual representation, in the context of social action the actual thing could never be understood as having 'a life of its own'. Rather, reification should be conceived of as a parallel movement of continuous physical representation that acts eventually to reinforce the innovating actor in a Parsonian norm structure, as well as to creatively set the foundations for practical consciousness. In the concluding section I will look more closely at how this may be synthesized into a conceptual model for innovation as social action.
Conclusion: A Framework for Innovation as Social Action
I will conclude this paper by recapitulating a few of the central tenets of the conceptualization of innovation as social action, as they have been elaborated above, with an additional attempt at synthesizing some of the central dialectical relationships implicated therein. These dialectical relationships could be said to exist between components of innovation as action as they constitute a context of innovation in which the actor is central. Figure 1 is a pictorial attempt at such a synthesis.
Actor, Purpose and Priesis Key to the act of innovation has, so far, been to view the actor as involved in various forms of purposive action, in combination with a number of qualifying aspects of how purpose is Organization 11(5) Articles conceived and executed. As far as the actor is concerned, be it a group or a person, priesis-or the practical engagement in activity-may be seen as an imperative for the genesis of innovation. These aspects of the innovation qua act may precede or succeed the rationality of purpose. However, they will most likely have to be viewed as combining in the direction of a conceptualized end, and they cannot be completely separated, analytically or practically. These aspects then reflect the intentionality of the act, in the sense of vision and fulfilment of goals. Creative or purposeful processes in the actor will, however, have to be transformed into situated work in order to create what Layton referred to as 'purposive adaptation of means to a preconceived end' (1974: 39; emphasis added).
Work and Change
The context of work is anywhere an actor applies some tool to a medium in order to transform it. Work and change are interconnected in the sense that work transforms the physical conditions for its own execution, as well as being affected, and indeed initiated, by external predispositions and altered conditions that the actor is merely responding to. It is likely, as I have argued in the section on Hegelian and Marxian notions of the dialectics of work and social context, that work is a physical outcome of a process of 'consumption' of previous worldly states by action. The dialectics of work and change are intimately and interactively related to the actor's priesis and purpose, a dialectics that generates practical consciousness and a normative foundation for action.
Practical Consciousness and Normative Action Work is, as I have previously discussed, a specific source of mental activity or of knowing in the innovation process. In the context of Marxian theory, this would 
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constitute practical consciousness: a cognitive state in between matter-offact application and conceptual ideation and vision. This vision or state of ideation may be seen as an immediate input into the material manifestation of the innovation as concept or idea. Opposite to this in Figure 1 , we see flowing from the dialectics of work and change a process of reifying innovation into a set of norm-driven social expectations. I believe it to be fruitful to see innovation as reification (see Lukács) and the normative dimension depicted by Parsons as mutually reinforcing in the act of innovating. The social identity or normative role-taking activity of the innovator is probably connected to certain stabilized and idealized manifestations of the innovation qua thing-as something projected and experienced 'outside' of the actor. The process of reifying innovation is thus predominantly a social process of being included in or excluded from the normative context of action as depicted above. In this way one may draw Figure 1 as a double spiral whose constitutive elements are: actor • purpose/preisis • work/ change • norms and role expectation • actor, in an iterative flow of continuous reification of the innovation/actor. Likewise, the circle of actor • purpose/preisis • work/change • practical consciousness • actor becomes one in which the process of conceiving of the innovation takes place.
Innovation between Concept and Production Finally, 'the circle of reifying'
and 'the circle of conceiving' are the primary contributions to the innovation as a physical manifestation. Through the interface of practical consciousness, the innovation qua concept is furthered, and, through the social intentions and norm-driven behaviour of the social setting at large, the social production of the innovation is carried through. The purposeful movement of the actor towards this concrete end is probably constrained by all the uncertainties and dynamic changes inherent in social life. As discussed above, the two prima facie kinds of action depicted by Hegel help us understand this progression more realistically, by seeing such purposeful movement as the realization of incremental intention on the one hand, or innovation as acting towards a preconceived goal on the other.
The assumptions made in this analysis are in a sense already laid down in the common understanding of what innovation is and what it means to innovate, which were touched upon at the beginning of this paper. The introduction of an actor perspective implies a critique of the role of 'programmed' social processes found in textbook accounts of innovation. It also necessitates a forging of reversed so-called demand-push and supply-pull explanations of innovation, not only as previously, on a broader societal level, but now also on the level of the intentional actor, who continuously merges these dimensions as part of developing a practical consciousness. This implies taking intention seriously in the Organization 11(5) Articles study of innovation, including such things as the interplay of identity, affective moods and goal conceptualization, as well as the related duality of norm fulfilment and social deviance involved in innovating. Research needs to explicate these assumptions in the light of social theory and socio-cognitive research traditions, and not be tempted to let expedient organizational design outcomes or context-specific institutional structures become explanatory factors in their own right.
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